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"Clear and Convincing" Libel: Fiction
and the Law of Defamation
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,1 the Supreme Court announced
that the First Amendment qualifies and restricts the common law of libel.
The Court's decisions since Sullivan have refined and limited the holding
in that case2 but have generally been marked by both a special solicitude
for free speech values and a recognition that the First Amendment re-
quires more "breathing space" for defamatory falsehoods than the com-
mon law provides.' But because Sullivan and its progeny have involved
situations in which the news media have proffered as true something that
is false, these cases and the standards they enunciate are mostly inapplica-
ble to works of fiction, which do not purport to be, and are acknowledged
by their creators not to be, factually true.
Because the news media seldom leave unclear to whom they refer, one
of the two constitutional bases for the holding in Sullivan has gone largely
unnoticed. The evidence in that case was deemed constitutionally defective
because it could not support a finding against the newspaper that the al-
legedly libelous statements were made "of and concerning" the plaintiff."
The "of and concerning" requirement-the demand that a defamatory
statement be in some sense "about" the plaintiff-is part of the common
law of libe 5 and is likely to be central to any defamation case involving
1. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that public official seeking to recover damages for libel
must prove "actual malice"-that defamatory falsehood was stated with knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard of truth).
2. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (plaintiff is private figure
because he had not "voluntarily thrust" himself into controversy); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111 (1979) (plaintiff is private figure because he did not thrust himself or his views into public
controversy); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (finding plaintiff not public figure because
she had not voluntarily put herself in forefront of public controversy); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974) (rejecting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) and holding that
"public figure" is determined by role in "forefront of particular public controversies" and that private
person may recover without meeting Sullivan standard); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29 (1971) (plurality opinion) (criterion not whether plaintiff is "public figure" but whether subject of
statement is matter "of public or general interest"); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968)
(holding that "actual malice" involves showing that defendant entertained serious doubts as to truth of
his statements); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending Sullivan rule to
"public figures," who do not hold government positions but are important in society); Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (defining "public official" as person whose position invites public scrutiny
and discussion).
3. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) ("erroneous statement is inevi-
table in free debate, and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breath-
ing space' that they 'need . . . to survive' ") (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
4. 376 U.S. at 288.
5. See, e.g., Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1273 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (test
is whether reasonable person could believe that article referred to plaintiff), afid, 535 F.2d 1255 (6th
Cir. 1976); Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 159 Mass. 293, 295, 34 N.E. 462, 463 (1893) (plaintiff
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fiction. Once a plaintiff proves his identity with a fictional character, ac-
tual falsity and the awareness thereof required by Sullivan probably will
follow readily from a statement's fictional context.
This Note suggests that there are circumstances under which works of
fiction can be libelous, and that development of the "of and concerning"
requirement both helps identify such circumstances and extends to fiction
the protection it deserves, while still vindicating the libel plaintiff's inter-
est in reputation. The Note accordingly proposes three criteria by which
to judge the evidence presented to prove the "of and concerning" require-
ment. Such evidence first of all should show unmistakability: The state-
ment in question must refer to the plaintiff and to no one else. Second, it
should show individuality: The statement must refer specifically and per-
sonally to the plaintiff, rather than to a broad group or general undertak-
ing. These requirements together assure clarity of reference to the plain-
tiff. Finally, the evidence should indicate that the statement could prompt
conviction in the reader: The allegedly defamatory description must in-
spire the belief of its audience before it can create legally compensable
damage to reputation. Only when a work of fiction meets all these crite-
ria, as well as the other standards of the law of defamation, should a
plaintiff be permitted to recover for libel.
I. The Present Law of Libel
Beginning with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court,
has fashioned a constitutional law of libel that centers on a defendant's
awareness of the truth or falsity of what he writes or publishes. In Bin-
drim v. Mitchell,6 the California Court of Appeals applied the Sullivan
"actual malice" rule to works of fiction. An analysis of Bindrim indicates
why a literal application of the Sullivan standard to fiction is undesirable.
A. Constitutional Standards
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the first case to apply the First
Amendment to libel law, relaxed the limitations imposed by the common
law of libel on free expression. A unanimous Supreme Court found that
"the central meaning of the First Amendment" resided in the "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust and wide-open." 7 Because "erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate," truth will not suffice as the sole defense for
must show defendant meant to refer to him); Coats v. News Corp., 355 Mo. 778, 783, 197 S.W.2d
958, 961 (1946) (plaintiff must establish reasonableness of belief that reference is to him).
6. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
7. 376 U.S. at 270.
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those who make allegedly libelous statements about public officials.'
Rather, such officials can recover damages only if a false defamatory state-
ment is made with " 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."9 The
Court subsequently extended the Sullivan actual malice rule to "public
figures"' 0 and has struggled to define the circumstances under which a
plaintiff can be deemed to be a public figure."
The Court addressed the issue of libel against private persons in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.'2 Private persons, the Court reasoned, are "more
vulnerable to injury" than public figures, who "usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a
more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private indi-
viduals normally enjoy."' More importantly, private individuals are
"more deserving of recovery" than either public officials or public figures,
who "have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from
defamatory falsehood concerning them.' 1 4 These considerations strengthen
the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for the
harm inflicted by libel.' 5 The Court, however, wished also to shield "the
press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defama-
tion.' 6 Gertz consequently permits the states to define their own stan-
dards of liability in libel suits brought by private persons "so long as they
do not impose liability without fault."' 7 State courts following Gertz have
generally chosen to adopt a fault standard based on an author's duty rea-
sonably to ascertain the truth of his defamatory allegations.'"
8. Id. at 271.
9. Id. at 280.
10. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
11. See supra note 2.
12. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
13. Id. at 344.
14. Id. at 345.
15. Gertz may also have important implications for "false-light" cases involving the right of pri-
vacy. Whereas plaintiffs in libel cases sue for damage to reputation, "false-light" plaintiffs allege what
might be called embarrassment, stemming from simple inaccuracy, not necessarily defamatory, in a
report that deals with them. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (holding that magazine
not liable for "false reports of matters of public interest" involving individual's private life, unless
actual malice established). It is unclear whether Hill survives the Gertz public-private distinction: In
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), the Court found actual malice and thus
declined to reach the issue of whether states might apply a more relaxed standard when the false-light
plaintiff is a private person. For a persuasive argument that the Sullivan rule has no place in a false-
light case, see Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied
to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968). Under present law, there is no
reason why a libel plaintiff embarrassed by a work of fiction cannot sue under a false-light theory as
well. There is also no reason why the proposals set forth in this Note would not apply in such a case.
16. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348.
17. Id. at 347.
18. Sixteen of the twenty states that have addressed Gertz have adopted a simple negligence stan-
dard. Some have elaborated an explicit duty to investigate. See Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.,
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B. Libel Law Applied to Fiction: Bindrim v. Mitchell
The libel cases decided by the Supreme Court since Sullivan have usu-
ally arisen when the news media, whose audience expects factual truth,
have inaccurately depicted the plaintiff. The well-publicized case of Bin-
drim v. Mitchell 9 demonstrates the result of a scrupulous and literal ap-
plication of the evolving Sullivan standard to a work of fiction.
Gwen Davis Mitchell enrolled in the "Nude Marathon" group therapy
sessions of Dr. Paul Bindrim, a clinical psychologist. She subsequently
wrote and published a novel entitled Touching, in which she described the
nude marathon therapy of a psychiatrist called Simon Herford.2" Herford
was a "'fat Santa Claus type with long white hair, white sideburns, a
cherubic rosy face and rosy forearms.' "21 Dr. Bindrim was clean-shaven
and had short hair.
Mitchell's portrait of Herford certainly was not flattering. Bindrim
sued for libel, a jury found in his favor, and the appellate court upheld the
verdict. Dr. Bindrim had conceded that he was a public figure, so the
court applied the Sullivan actual malice test, seeking "sufficient evidence
to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of [her] publication."22 The court found Mitchell's
"reckless disregard" of the truth "apparent from her knowledge of the
truth of what transpired at the encounter, and [its difference from] the
literary portrayal of that encounter."2"
Moreover, the court held that the evidence satisfied the "of and con-
cerning" requirement of Sullivan and the common law despite the differ-
ences in name, appearance, and academic degree between Bindrim and
114 Ariz. 309, 315, 560 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1977) (test is whether defendant acted reasonably in at-
tempting to discover truth or falsity of publication); Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 33 Conn.
Supp. 4, 8, 356 A.2d 472, 475 (Super. Ct. 1975) (standard is whether defendant failed to investigate
facts properly); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 418 (Tenn. 1978) (test is one of
"reasonable care and caution in checking on the truth or falsity" of communication). Even those
courts that state the standard merely in terms of whether the defendant "knew or should have known"
the truth, see, e.g., Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1123 (1977); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976), seem in
effect to bave adopted a "reasonable investigation" standard. This is certainly the import of Gertz
itself, where the Court indicates that its fault standard would protect a publisher that "took every
reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy of its assertions," 418 U.S. at 346.
19. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
20. Id. at 69, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 33. Before the therapy session, Mitchell also signed a contract
with Bindrim, saying she would not "write articles, or in any manner disclose who has attended the
workshop or what has transpired." Id. On the basis of this agreement, the jury made a damages
award on a breach of contract claim. The trial court set aside the award and the appellate court
agreed, holding that what Mitchell saw was part of her own treatment and that she was free to report
on it. Id. at 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 41. There is, of course, no way to tell what influence the apparent
violation of the contract in Bindrim had on the libel issue for the jury.
21. Id. at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (quoting from novel Touching).
22. Id. at 72, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).
23. Id. at 72-73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
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Herford. Plaintiff would be barred from recovery, the court said, if "no
one who knew [him] could possibly identify [him] with the character in
the novel." 24 After comparing a transcript of the encounter attended by
Mitchell with her fictional account of a therapy session, and after review-
ing the testimony of three witnesses, who based their identifications exclu-
sively on the way Herford practiced his therapy-a form of therapy not
exclusively Bindrim's own25-the court found "overwhelming evidence
that plaintiff and 'Herford' were one."26
The court rejected the defendants' argument that labelling Touching a
novel precluded belief that any of its characters represented "an actual
nonfiction person," asking instead "whether a reasonable person, reading
the book, would understand that the fictional character therein pictured
was, in actual fact, the plaintiff acting as described." Because the answer
to this question was not a categorical "no," the issue was for the jury."
The defendants also contended that the statements at issue in the novel
were not false statements of fact but, rather, opinions upon which no libel
could be predicated.28 But because "the published material purport[ed] to
state actual facts concerning the characters in a novel," the court found
that the statements "could be determined either as fact or opinion," and
again the question was for the jury.29 The court affirmed a modified judg-
24. Id. at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (citing Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th
Cir. 1962)).
25. Id. at 86, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 44 (Files, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 38 (majority opinion).
27. Id. at 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (citing Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141,
143 (4th Cir 1969)).
28. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("[U]nder the First Amend-
ment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.").
29. Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 77-78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39. It has been suggested elsewhere that
the privilege available for statements of opinion be applied to works of fiction. See Silver, Libel, the
'Higher Truths' of Art, and the First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1086 (1978). Novels,
after all, are efforts at interpretation, attempts to portray life as the author sees it. The problem with
treating works of fiction as opinions is that they do not look like opinions, any more than does report-
age that is equally the product of one person's mind and also susceptible to the manipulations of a
clever user of language. Several classic texts on the art of fiction suggest that fiction is "dramatic": It
shows things rather than tells them, and lets the reader draw his own conclusions. See F. FORD, THE
ENGLISH NOVEL 128-29 (1929) ("[Tlhe novelist must not, by taking sides, exhibit his preferences
.... He has ...to render and not to tell."); P. LUBBOCK, THE CRAFT OF FICTION 62 (1921)
("iThe art of fiction does not begin until the novelist thinks of his story as a matter to be shown, to be
so exhibited that it will tell itself."); cf. J. SARTRE, WHAT IS LITERATURE? 169 (B. Frechtman trans.
1949) (novels should "exist in the manner of things, of plants, of events, and not at first like products
of man"). Recent literary criticism has been highly sensitive to the mistake of identifying even a first-
person narrator with his creator; even this apparently authoritative storytelling voice has the status of
a created character rather than a mere mouthpiece. See M. BEARDSLEY, AESTHETICS 240 (1958)
("[Tlhe speaker of a literary work cannot be identifed with the author-and therefore the character
and condition of the speaker can be known by internal evidence alone."); S. CHATMAN, STORY AND
DISCOURSE 147 (1978) ("That it is essential not to confuse author and narrator has become a com-
monplace of literary theory."); cf W. BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF FICTION 152 (1961) ("iTlhe range
of human types that have been dramatized as narrators is almost as great as the range of other
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ment of $50,000 in compensatory damages and, based on the finding of
actual malice,3" $25,000 in punitive damages."'
The opinion and result in Bindrim are in no way aberrations. The
court applied the Sullivan rule literally, and thus had no difficulty in find-
ing actual malice simply from the author's knowledge of the difference
between the real events in question and her fictional account of those
events. The language of the tests for the "of and concerning" requirement
and for treating the claim of immunity from libel for fiction per se was
drawn from earlier opinions. Nor did the denial of privilege for statements
of opinion in a work of fiction and the allowance of punitive damages
predicated on a finding of actual malice depart in any way from prior
law. 32
Yet Bindrim, despite (or perhaps because of) its typicality, is a troub-
ling case. The plaintiff's ease in surmounting the actual malice hurdle, his
facility in meeting the "of and concerning" requirement, and the court's
refusal to grapple with the problems that arise when a work that makes
no pretense to tell literal truth is nonetheless alleged to harm a plaintiff's
reputation, all suggest both the inadequacy of the present libel law when
applied to fiction and the need for development of more meaningful stan-
dards for such cases.
II. Problems with the Present Law of Libel
The dominance of Sullivan and its progeny in the area of libel law
virtually assures that the wrong analytical tools will be employed in deal-
ing with the relatively uncommon case of alleged defamation by a fictional
work. By establishing as a criterion of libel a writer's awareness of falsity,
Sullivan and the succeeding constitutional cases neglect the situation of a
libel suit brought against a novelist, whose work is admittedly
"false"-and known to be so by reader and author alike. At the same
time, the Supreme Court has done nothing to clarify the "of and concern-
ing" requirement of libel, which determines the identification of an ag-
fictional characters."); J. MILLER, THE FORM OF VICTORIAN FICTION 4 (1968) ("novelist plays the
role of a role-player," an omniscient narrator "who can enter into the lives of other people"). There is
something objective about fiction: Its quasi-dramatic aspect isolates it from its creator and deprives it
of the clearly editorializing voice that characterizes what we normally think of as statements of opin-
ion. A court asking "whether the challenged language can reasonably be read as stating a fact,"
Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 380 Mass. 336, 339, 403 N.E.2d 376, 378 (1980), and examining
"the statement in its totality in the context in which it was uttered or published," Information Control
Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980), is likely, given the appar-
ent (if illusory) objectivity of fiction, to do as the Bindrim court did and simply leave the matter to the
jury.
30. See infra p. 527 (discussing "actual malice" as requirement for punitive damages).
31. Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 81-82, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
32. See supra note 29; infra pp. 526-27.
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grieved plaintiff with the character responsible for the defamation. This
requirement, in the hands of lower courts applying the common law, has
proven to be an imprecise and inconsistent test. It is badly in need of the
elaboration that alone can make it meaningful to potential litigants.
A. The Current Constitutional Approach
The Supreme Court has suggested, although not in the context of libel
litigation, that works of art and entertainment are entitled to First
Amendment protection.3 The Court has also stated, however, that "calcu-
lated falsehood," "the lie, knowingly and deliberately published," deserves
no such protection. 4 The two statements seem inconsistent, for works of
fiction, while not purporting to be factually true and therefore not pre-
cisely "lies," surely are calculated fabrications. Because the constitutional
law of libel has evolved chiefly in cases concerning the news media and
thus has dealt with statements purportedly true but actually false, the
Court's pronouncements on the calculated falsehoods that arise in more
typical libel cases have been misapplied to works of fiction. As a result,
such works now enjoy only very limited First Amendment protection.
The precise scope of the Sullivan rule, which assists the news media by
giving them a limited constitutional privilege for erroneously defamatory
statements, is meaningless when applied to works of fiction. Actual malice,
as the Bindrim court observed, "concentrates solely on defendants' attitude
toward the truth or falsity of the material published. . . and not on mali-
cious motives."3 5 But because authors are generally in a position to know
the truth or falsity of their own fictional material, a jury may-indeed,
virtually must-find any allegedly defamatory work to be actually
malicious.
Not only is Sullivan's supposed barrier to liability actually no barrier at
all when the statements at issue are fictional; "actual malice" is also a
predicate in libel suits to punitive damages. The Court has indicated that
only plaintiffs who establish liability under a Sullivan standard (or one
more stringent, though no more stringent standard has been adopted) can
33. See Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (entertainment falls "within the First
Amendment guarantee"); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (Court has never
suggested "that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters
• ..is not entitled to full First Amendment protection"); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 501-02 (1952) (movies' importance as organ of public opinion not lessened by entertainment
value); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (First Amendment protects material that
entertains); cl Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (to be deemed obscene and thus subject to
state regulation, work must lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value").
34. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
35. Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36; see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (plurality opinion) (ill will and bad motive are not elements of "actual
malice").
4 526
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recover presumed or punitive damages.3 6 Thus, while only some news-
media defendants are liable for such damages, all writers and publishers
of fiction are potentially liable-and rendered so by the same actual mal-
ice standard that fails to furnish them any protection during the initial
determination of guilt.
37
Nor does the Gertz standard, permitting states to define liability in def-
amation suits by private persons "so long as they do not impose liability
without fault,"" clarify the problems arising when the law of libel con-
fronts a work of fiction. Gertz offers little enough guidance as to what
constitutes a fault standard for libel in the context of a news story; one
hardly can expect it to illuminate the means of applying that standard to
fiction. Courts following Gertz have generally chosen to adopt a fault
standard based on an author's duty reasonably to ascertain the truth of his
defamatory allegations. 9 But a work of fiction does not promise literal
"truth"; a novelist has nothing to investigate.
Sullivan and Gertz, of course, are not wholly inapplicable to libel cases
involving fiction. They maintain the common-law requirement that the
allegedly libelous statement in fact be defamatory.40 They appear to ac-
knowledge that truth will always be a complete defense to a charge of
libel.4" Most importantly, they establish standards that consider the au-
36.
[W]e hold that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least
when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth . . . . In short, the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less
demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as
are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974).
37. The holding in Gertz does not itself make clear whether a private libel plaintiff in a state that
adopts a standard of liability for private plaintiffs less stringent than that of Sullivan can ever recover
presumed or punitive damages. But subsequent state and federal decisions indicate that private plain-
tiffs in states with a fault standard have the option of attempting to prove actual malice in order to
recover more than actual damages. See, e.g., McQuoid v. Springfield Newspapers, Inc., 502 F. Supp.
1050 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (considering issue of actual malice prior to and separate from discussion of
plaintiff's public or private status); Pirre v. Printing Developments, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1028
(S.D.N.Y.) (holding that under Connecticut law, private plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages
on showing of actual malice), alfPd, 614 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979); Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 453 F.
Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1978) (acknowledging possibility of private plaintiffs recovering punitive dam-
ages), atfd, 644 F.2d 1044 (4th Cir. 1981); Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4,
356 A.2d 472 (Super. Ct. 1975) (same). The breadth of actual damages for libel recognized in Time,
Inc., v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (allowing $100,000 jury award for mental anguish), may
make the availability of punitive or presumed damages in any given case less important.
38. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
39. See supra note 18.
40. Defamation traditionally has been viewed as consisting of "utterances which arouse hatred,
contempt, scorn and the like." See Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 151 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 797 (1946). The Second Restatement of Torts takes a more general
approach: "A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
41. Implicit in the Sullivan actual malice rule is the proposition that there is a constitutional right
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thor's intent and knowledge in a judgment of his liability. They thus ab-
rogate the common-law rule that even an inadvertent or unintentional ref-
erence to a libel plaintiff is potentially libelous."2
Generally, though, while Sullivan provides a standard of liability that is
all too easily applied to fiction, Gertzs minimal fault standard seems diffi-
cult to apply. The only definition of a novelist's "fault" that does not
import unwelcome aesthetic criteria to a legal setting is that he has some-
how failed to write "fiction": that his work, though purportedly about
fictional characters, in fact refers circumstantially, credibly, and defam-
atorily to real people. And this definition suggests that courts should look
to the "of and concerning" requirement of libel-the requirement that the
allegedly libelous statements actually refer to the plaintiff-when they
deal with potentially libelous works of fiction. Sullivan and Gertz are both
designed to extend protection for speech beyond that provided by common
law and to diminish the need for media self-censorship 3 by providing
rules that preclude "unpredictable results and uncertain expectations." 44
But the present law of libel concerning fiction offers defendants neither
protection nor predictability and will not do so until more appropriate
standards are developed.
B. The "Of and Concerning" Requirement
Satisfaction of the "of and concerning" requirement of libel often will
to speak defamatory truth. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). In Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489-90 (1975), however, the Court in dictum leaves open the question
whether truth is a constitutionally required defense to a libel action by a private plaintiff. Justice
Powell's concurrence, however, argues that the defense of truth is implicit in the Gertz minimum fault
standard. 420 U.S. at 498-99 (Powell, J., concurring). The dispute may have been resolved in Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 458 (1976), where the majority observed in dictum that "demonstra-
tion that an article was true would seem to preclude finding the publisher at fault." In any event, the
tendency to interpret Gertzs negligence requirement as imposing a duty reasonably to ascertain the
truth of a published statement, see supra note 18, suggests that Juistice Powell's view prevails.
42. See, e.g., Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1966) (author's intent
irrelevant in determining defamation); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 209,
127 P.2d 577, 581 (1942) (author's intent irrelevant in determining defamation); Corrigan v. Bobbs-
Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 64, 126 N.E. 260, 262 (1920) ("[T]he question is not so much who was
aimed at but who was hit."); E. Hulton v. Jones, 26 T.L.R. 128 (H.L. 1909) (question not author's
intent but public's reasonable understanding of his intent).
Even before Gertz, however, some courts protected from liability authors who inadvertently referred
to plaintiffs. See Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 159 Mass. 293, 295, 34 N.E. 462, 463 (1893) (if
writing is ambiguous, plaintiff must show defendant intended to refer to him); Landau v. CBS, 205
Misc. 357, 128 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aftd, 1 A.D.2d 660, 147 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1955); People
v. Charles Scribner's Sons, 205 Misc. 818, 130 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Magis. Ct. 1954).
43. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (Sullivan standard "administers an
extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media self-censorship of the common-law rule of
strict liability for libel and slander"). Though its negligence standard for private plaintiffs lightens the
burden placed upon plaintiffs by Sullivan, Gertz itself is a "caveat against strict liability." Id. at 347
n.10.
44. Id. at 343.
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be all that is required of a plaintiff seeking recovery of damages for al-
leged defamation by a work of fiction. But this requirement, which gener-
ally takes the form of an unelaborated reasonable-person standard, lacks
both content and consistency when applied to works of fiction. The short-
comings of the current "of and concerning" standard can lead to the same
kind of "chilling effect" on writers and publishers that the Sullivan hold-
ing sought to prevent.45
1. Problems with the Current "Of and Concerning" Requirement
Typical news-media libel cases, whatever their complexities, present no
mystery as to whom the defamatory statements are about. Because consti-
tutional libel jurisprudence has dealt almost exclusively with such cases,
the Supreme Court's second basis for the disposition in Sullivan-that the
evidence in the case was "constitutionally defective" because "incapable of
supporting the jury's finding that the allegedly libelous statements were
made 'of and concerning' respondent""4e-has gone undeveloped.
In libel cases involving fiction, however, the plaintiff's recognizability as
a character in a particular work is likely to be not merely central to but
dispositive of the case. Because fiction does not claim to be factually true,
the constitutional requirement of actual malice probably will be easily sat-
isfied. A plaintiff sufficiently aroused to initiate what may be a long and
costly litigation can probably show that the statements at issue are false.-
Only the "of and concerning" requirement will stand between him and
recovery.
But the outlines of this last requirement are hazy. The Supreme Court
declined to hear Bindrim v. Mitchell,4 and libel cases involving fiction are
relatively rare. The development of the "of and concerning" requirement
has been left entirely to lower courts applying the common law. Most
courts use some variation of a reasonable-person standard when applying
the "of and concerning" requirement: If a reasonable person could reason-
ably believe that the character in question refers to the plaintiff, the re-
quirement is satisfied.48 The test seems unobjectionable in principle, but
45. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (rule compelling would-be
critics of official conduct to guarantee truth of factual assertions might deter them "from voicing their
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so").
46. Id. at 288.
47. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
48. See, e.g., Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980) ("reasonable reader must
rationally suspect" character is plaintiff); Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141, 142
(4th Cir. 1969) (standard is whether character reasonably could be understood as portrayal of plain-
tiff); Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1962) (whether reasonable person
who knew plaintiff could reasonably identify her with character); Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures,
Inc., 191 F.2d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 1951) (whether character reasonably could be understood as por-
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its present vagueness leads to results so unpredictable that no author or
publisher can be confident of having avoided libel.
An examination of libel decisions involving works of fiction reveals the
problems with the test in its present form. Courts differ over what sorts of
similarities serve to identify a plaintiff with his alleged fictional counter-
part,4 and over the significance of dissimilarities between plaintiffs and
characters who otherwise resemble each other.5" Nor do courts agree
about the legal effects of an author's lack of intent to write "of and con-
cerning" the plaintiff,51 of the standard disclaimer accompanying fictional
works,52 or of other indications of a work's fictitiousness. 3 Finally, "fic-
trayal of plaintiff); Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1273 (S.D. Ohio 1975)
(whether reasonable person could believe article referred to plaintiff), afld., 535 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir.
1976); cf. Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1966) (libel must designate
plaintiff" 'in such a way as to let those who knew understand he was meant' "); Bindrim v. Mitchell,
92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39 (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
49. Compare Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (plaintiff prevailed
despite differences in name and physical characteristics), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979) and Peti-
tioner's Brief for Certiorari at 13-15, id. ("of and concerning" requirement satisfied by testimony of
three of plaintiff's friends, identifying plaintiff on the basis of similarity of his method of therapy to
character's) and Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff's averments that she and
character shared only name and physical characteristics, and that she was casually acquainted with
author, sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss) with Wright v. R.K.O. Pictures, 55 F. Supp. 639,
640 (D. Mass. 1944) (finding for defendant because film in question, while containing certain features
that might have associated the characters portrayed with the plaintiffs, "omitted or changed a lot of
details which might have served to tie up" characters with real people).
50. Compare Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1962) (sustaining
summary judgment for defendant because reasonable reader "would more likely conclude that the
author created [the character] in an ugly way so that none would identify her with" plaintiff) with
Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1966) (rejecting defendant's argument
that "many dissimilarities" between plaintiff and character in novel "destroy any reference the less
numerous similarities might create alone" and finding that dissimilarities "pose an issue of fact as to
identification, making summary judgment inappropriate").
51. Compare Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1273 (S.D. Ohio 1975)
(holding author's intent immaterial to "of and concerning" test), afl'd, 535 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1976)
with Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276, 280 (D.Minn. 1947) (defendant granted summary judgment
because "the writer intended to portray no actual person"). See also cases cited supra note 42 (demon-
strating results on "intent" question). But cf. text accompanying note 42 (suggesting Sullivan and
Gertz make intent a predicate of libel).
52. Compare Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 653-54 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that
standard disclaimer did not affect merits of case) and Kelly v. Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473, 485 (D.
Mass. 1948) (finding film's disclaimers "disingenuous" and "tongue-in-the-cheek" and holding for
plaintiff) with Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 432-433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (granting
dismissal of plaintiff's right-of-publicity case because "fictionalization" in question would "by the
presence of the word 'novel' [on its cover]" indicate to the reader "that the work was fictitious," thus
indicating "[no] attempt . . . to present the disputed events as true") and Smith v. Huntington Pub-
lishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1273-74 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (sustaining summary judgment for defen-
dant, despite "very similar" characteristics and identical names of plaintiff and character, and despite
presentation of story as "true," because of "clear statement by the author in boldface print that the
names were fictitious"), afi'd, 535 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1976).
53. Compare Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir. 1969) (basing
decision for defendant partly upon "the common understanding of fiction as fiction only") with Pring
v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982) (characterization of article as "fiction" or
"humor" in magazine in which it appeared is irrelevant to libel determination), cert. denied, 51
U.S.L.W. 3897 (U.S. June 21, 1983) (No. 82-1621) and Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276, 277 (D.
Minn. 1947) (mentioning but not finding dispositive the fact that "jacket of the book designates the
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tionalizations" of real-life events receive inconsistent judicial treatment:
Some courts downplay, but others emphasize, the increased danger with
such works "that the public . . . will believe that the presentation refers
to the plaintiff.
54
The standards invoked by various courts for their "of and concerning"
requirements yield no particular principles on which litigants can rely.
Authors and publishers simply cannot tell which aspects of a portrayal
will be considered significant in comparing plaintiffs and characters. They
cannot tell whether a fictional description's "ugliness" serves to preclude
identification or whether it constitutes false and libelous matter. They will
be unsure whether even their best efforts will shield them from libel, or
whether a mere disclaimer will suffice. They will be uncertain what liber-
ties they may take with historical characters and events. And even if they
are confident of prevailing, they will be unsure, in an era of enormous
litigation costs,55 of what stage in the litigation will bring them success.
These same uncertainties also confront a plaintiff who believes himself
libeled by a work of fiction.
2. The Need for a More Specific "Of and Concerning" Requirement
There appears to be a fundamental illogicality in applying the law of
libel to fiction. Fiction, after all, is fictitious. A novel announces itself as
factually untrue; arguably, readers know this, and neither take nor have
any right to take its words as referring literally to the real world. Further-
more, quite aside from the fictitiousness of fiction, there seems to be some-
thing absurd about permitting liability for fictional works. What is similar
to the plaintiff in a given work identifies him; what is dissimilar and un-
flattering is false and defamatory, and therefore libelous.58 At the very
least, this paradox suggests a case in which a plaintiff, by relying on mi-
nor or adventitious similarities between himself and a fictional character
story as 'a major full length novel.' ").
54. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, 243, 126
S.E.2d 873, 881 (1962). This case involved a television program portraying the escape of At Capone
from federal custody, in part through the offices of a corrupt guard. Capone's real-life guard prevailed
in a libel suit, even though his name was not used, he did not physically resemble the actor portraying
the corrupt guard, and the program offered a disclaimer of its truthfulness. See also Kelly v. Loew's,
Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473, 477, 485 (D. Mass. 1948) (despite disclaimer, film based on book purporting to
be "substantially accurate report of 'historical events'" "plainly asked the audience to believe" that
character "was substantially like" inaccurately portrayed plaintiff). But see Hicks v. Casablanca
Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (presence of the word "novel" on cover sufficient to
insulate from right-of-publicity claim a fictionalization of incident in life of Agatha Christie).
55. On the costliness of libel litigation, see Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX.
L. REV. 422, 424-25, 435-36 (1975).
56. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 86, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 44 (Files, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
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to satisfy the "of and concerning" requirement, might prevail upon a sym-
pathetic judge or jury to obtain a recovery.57 In fact, one recent opinion
inverts the paradox and notes "the disturbing irony inherent in the
scheme: the more virtuous the victim of the libel, the less likely it will be
that she will be able to establish this essential confusion [between plaintiff
and character] in the mind of the third party."58 If the law of libel is to be
applied at all to fiction, it must seek a path between the two versions of
this paradox. A more specific "of and concerning" requirement can define
the degree of similarity and dissimilarity between plaintiffs and fictional
characters needed to support a finding of liability.
In addition, despite the common understanding of the term "fiction"
and the standard disclaimer of resemblance to real people and events that
prefaces many fictional works, many readers seem nonetheless inclined to
take fiction, or aspects of fiction, as the literal truth. Authors occasionally
express their exasperation at readers' assumptions that their novels are
"really" reportage or biography.59 Nor are presumably sophisticated liter-
ary critics immune to this practice: Much criticism and literary biography
is devoted to locating the real-life sources of the characters in fiction.Y0
The plaintiff's witnesses in Bindrim understood the novel in question to
be "fiction" yet testified that they identified a character in the novel as the
plaintiff,"1 and their testimony convinced the jury on that point. Such con-
tradictions have led one commentator to suggest that a book "determined
57. A well-known commentary on Sullivan makes a similar (though not identical) point. The
plaintiff there prevailed in the lower courts with a
technique by which defamation might be endlessly manufactured. First, it is argued that, con-
trary to all appearances, a statement referred to the plaintiff; then, that it falsely ascribed to
the plaintiff something that he did not do, which should be rather easy to prove about a
statement that did not refer to plaintiff in the first place.
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on 'The Central Meaning of the First Amendment',
1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 199. The more important question for fiction arises not when a fictional
character does not refer at all to a real person, but rather when there is some resemblance between
character and plaintiff and a court must ask how much "reference" adds up to "identification."
58. Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980).
59. See, e.g., H. JAMES, THEORY OF FICTION 204-05 (J. Miller ed. 1972) (James's mortification
upon learning that an acquaintance thought herself to be source for character in his novel The Bos-
tonians); Finkielkraut, The Ghosts of Roth, ESQUIRE, Sept. 1981, at 92, 94 ("To label books like
mine 'autobiographical' . . . is not only to falsify their suppositional nature but. . . to slight the very
artfulness that leads some readers to think that they must be autobiographical.") (interview with
Philip Roth).
60. A list of supposed real-life prototypes of fictional characters might be multiplied almost end-
lessly through a reading of literary biography. See, e.g., C. BAKER, ERNEST HEMINGWAY 179 (1969)
(characters in The Sun Also Rises based on real people); C. BROOKS, WILLIAM FAULKNER 384, 391-
92, 446 (1963) (real-life prototypes of characters in Sartoris, Sanctuary and The Reivers); L. EDEL,
HENRY JAMES: THE MASTER 111-12 (1972) (prototypes of characters in The Wings of the Dove); J.
MELLOW, NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE IN HIS TIMES 399-400 (1980) (real-life sources of characters in
The Blithedale Romance); E. MILLER, MELVILLE 239-40 (1975) (sources for characters in Pierre); A.
TURNBULL, SCOTT FITZGERALD 305-06 (1962) (source of protagonist of The Last Tycoon).
61. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 14, Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
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to be fictional" should be absolutely immune to defamation suits.62 But
the contradiction seems to be one that the law must live with. If readers
can both acknowledge that a work is "fictional" and still believe that it
refers to a real person, then the label attached to the work should be no
more dispositive than is the routine disclaimer. Only a standard more at-
tuned to a reader's actual belief in the contents of the work can address
and resolve this contradiction.
A specific "of and concerning" requirement can also provide a neces-
sary limit to the First Amendment protection enjoyed by fiction. Authors
themselves may recognize, quite independently of any legal advice they
receive, the defamatory capacity of their work. The novelist-defendant in
Bindrim told a witness in the case that she had painted a "devastating
portrait" of the plaintiff.63 Writing a novel is clearly no small undertak-
ing. It should not surprise us if the motives for such a project are diverse,
and sometimes include hatred, malice (in the traditional sense of the
term), and revenge. There is no good reason why such motives, when they
result in a novel genuinely damaging to reputation, should receive any
greater protection than they would have received had they led to the pro-
duction of a similar work of nonfiction.
It is, moreover, an observation as old as literary criticism itself, and
long predating the ascendancy of "realistic" prose fiction in Western liter-
ary culture,6 ' that readers enjoy and value imitations of life for their own
sake.65 It has been argued that the relentless circumstantiality of fiction is
62. Comment, Defamation in Fiction: The Case for Absolute First Amendment Protection, 29
AM. U.L. REV. 571, 593 (1980). The author proposes that absolute protection be provided when "a
reasonable person of average literary sophistication" would label the work in question fiction. Id. As
suggested above, however, this labelling is compatible with a belief that a plaintiff is identifiable with
a fictional character. The requirement that a work be considered fiction seems a less effective surro-
gate for the more precise requirement, proposed in this Note, that it prompt in certain specific ways
belief in the literal truth of its reference to a real person.
The contention that fiction is uniquely entitled to absolute First Amendment protection should be
distinguished from the "true" absolutist position, associated with Justices Black and Douglas, that the
First Amendment prohibits any restraint on speech. See generally Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960); Countryman, Justice Douglas and Freedom of Expression, 1978 U. ILL.
L.F. 301. Justice Douglas foresaw some of the problems discussed in this Note and argued that a
fictionalized account of a news event was "as much in the public domain as would be a water color of
the assassination of a public official." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 401 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (false-light privacy case).
63. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 91 Cal. App. 3d 61, 69, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 34, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
984 (1979).
64. Though no literary form lacks antecedents, and certain features of the novel can be found in
the literature of antiquity, it is broadly true that the novel originated in the early 18th century. See L.
STEVENSON, THE ENGLISH NOVEL 54-78 (1960); I. WATT, THE RISE OF THE NOVEL 9-34 (1957).
65. See ARISTOTLE, POETICS (S. Butcher trans.), in S. BUTCHER, ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF PO-
ETRY AND FINE ART 15 (4th ed. 1951) (imitation "is one instinct of our nature"); id. at 11 ("the
objects of imitation are men in action."). For Aristotle, however, "the emphasis is on actions, not on
the men performing the action . . . . Action comes first, it is the object of imitation. The agents who
perform the action come second." Hardison, A Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, in ARISTOTLE'S
POETICS: A TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY FOR STUDENTS OF LITERATURE (0. Hardison & L.
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as conventional as the purest romance or fantasy, a "literary genre"
only. 66 But even contemporary criticism, which makes much of the arbi-
trariness, conventionality, and nonreferentiality of even the most "realis-
tic" fiction, allows a place for this exclusively mimetic function of litera-
ture.6' The fact is that people evidently value the quasi-deception that
fiction practices, its illusion of reality. If fiction sometimes becomes an
outright and intentional deception, capable of harm, the legal solution
should not be to bemoan the lack of an enlightened readership, but to seek
better principles for detecting and compensating the harm. And because
the existence of the harm depends on whether readers of a work of fiction
believe a character actually to be a real person, the "of and concerning"
requirement seems the right area in which to seek these principles.
III. A New Standard for Libel in Fiction
Although realistic fiction shares many of its techniques with reportage,
it makes use of "facts" in a different way. Whereas reportage endeavors to
tell the literal truth, fiction aims to make a synecdochic statement: It is a
"slice of life," offered less for the sake of the particular "facts" it presents
than for the sake of what it represents about the human condition gener-
ally. Only when a work purportedly fictional offers an account of particu-
lar, identifiable people taking believable action is it truly indistinguishable
from reportage, and only then should it be vulnerable to a charge of defa-
mation. An "of and concerning" test that inquires into the clarity with
Golden eds. 1968). For Plato, "all poetry, from Homer onwards, consists in representing a semblance
of its subject," leaving poetry "at the third remove from reality," a semblance merely. PLATO, REPUB-
LIC 331, 329 (F. Cornford trans. 1945).
66. Silver, supra note 29, at 1086; see also I. WATT, supra note 64, at 32 ("Formal realism is, of
course, like the rules of evidence, only a convention; and there is no reason why the report on human
life which is presented by it should in fact be any truer than those presented through the very differ-
ent conventions of other literary genres."). The same point has been made about the characters of
fiction: "The character we admire as the result of loving attention is something constructed by conven-
tions as arbitrary as any other, and we can only hope to recover an art by recognizing it as an art."
Price, The Other Self, in IMAGINED WORLDS 279, 293 (M. Mack ed. 1968).
It has been contended, however, that realism is not one genre among many but an evolutionary
improvement in literature: Its introduction in the 18th century "was like the introduction of electricity
into machine technology. It raised the state of the art to an entirely new magnitude." T. WOLFE, THE
NEW JOURNALISM at xi (1974).
67. Structuralist critics reconcile the conventional and mimetic aspects of realistic fiction by sug-
gesting that "the basic convention governing the novel is the expectation that readers will, through
their contact with the text be able to recognize a world which it produces or to which it refers." J.
CULLER, STRUCTURALIST POETICS 192 (1975). "In place of the novel as mimesis we have the novel as
a structure which plays with different modes of ordering and enables the reader to understand how he
makes sense of the world." Id. at 238. But realistic fiction nonetheless contains elements whose func-
tion it is "to assert the representational or mimetic orientation of fiction." Id. at 193. One critic, for
example, isolates in a particular text five "codes," organizational categories which enable a reader to
group together and treat as meaningful diverse elements in a novella by Balzac. One of these codes is
"cultural" or "referential"; it "appear[s] to establish reality, 'Life.'" R. BARTHES, S/Z 206 (R. How-
ard trans. 1974).
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which a fictional portrait refers to the plaintiff and into the conviction that
portrait prompts in the reader seems the best way to determine whether a
work of fiction resembles a factual report sufficiently to damage a plain-
tiff's reputation.
A. Fiction as Synecdoche
Perhaps the chief conceptual problem in applying the law of libel to
novels derives not from fiction's fictitiousness per se but from the fact that
its peculiar value is due to both its "falsity" and its "truth." Because even
the most rigorously naturalistic novelist is not bound by literal, historical
fact, he can offer an epitome of reality, a distilled version of the world that
implicitly generalizes individual experience and suggests the broad signifi-
cance of particular people, things, and events. A novelist selects from the
welter of experience and the realm of the possible those things he consid-
ers important and combines them to emphasize his beliefs.6 8 A novel,
however well it sustains the illusion that it merely reports on life, is al-
ways in a sense symbolic: It offers itself as a concrete embodiment of an
abstract and general truth.
But "symbolic" is in fact an inaccurate term. It suggests a one-to-one
correspondence between concrete fact and abstract idea, thereby implying
that fiction is always "about" ideas, that it serves as a veiled philosophical
discourse. But the themes of fiction are not often readily reducible to the
propositions of philosophy. 9 A better term to describe fiction is "synec-
dochic." Synecdoche is the name for the rhetorical device whereby a part
68. The locus dassicus for this notion may perhaps be found in Henry James:
In proportion as in what fiction offers us we see life without rearrangement do we feel that
we are touching the truth; in proportion as we see it with rearrangement do we feel that we
are being put off with a substitute . . . . Art is essentially selection, but it is a selection whose
main care is to be typical, to be inclusive.
H. JAMES, THEORY OF FICTION 39 (J. Miller ed. 1972). This argument-that formal arrangement
and imitative realism are fully compatible-is frequently made. See, e.g., E. KRIS, PSYCHOANALYTIC
EXPLORATIONS IN ART 52 (1952) ("Every line or every stroke of the chisel is a simplification, a
reduction of reality . . . . But destruction of the real is fused with construction of its image. . . ."); I.
MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GOOD 84-85 (1970) ("Good art reveals. . . the minute and
absolutely random detail of the world, and reveals it together with a sense of unity and form ....
We are presented with a truthful image of the human condition in a form which can be steadily
contemplated; and indeed this is the only context in which many of us are capable of contemplating it
at all.").
For other critics, the relationship between the randomness of reality and the demand that fiction be
ordered and arranged is more problematic. See F. KERMODE, THE SENSE OF AN ENDING 11, 133
(1967) (discussing man's "permanent need to live by the pattern rather than the fact" and noting
"difficulty in relating one's fictions to what one knows about the nature of reality").
69.
[T]he artist is not asked to construct an adequate philosophy, but a philosophically adequate
world, a different matter altogether. He creates an object. . . from whose nature, as from our
own world, a philosophical system may be inferred; but he does not, except by inadvertence or
mistaken esthetic principle, deem it his task to philosophize.
W. GASS, FICTION AND THE FIGURES OF LIFE 9 (1972).
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is made to stand for a whole.7" And this is what fiction does: It offers a
more or less narrow, more or less particular version of experience not only
for its own sake but also in order to enable a reader to say, "Life's like
that." Serious fiction usually asks to be taken for more than it appears
literally to be: It aspires to be seen as a "slice of life," a synecdoche that
reflects on reality generally by presenting one aspect of reality.
7 1
This synecdochic dimension of realistic fiction is what distinguishes it
from, and gives it value apart from, reportage. Whether a novel offers
escape from the reader's reality, initiation into a grimmer reality, or an
interpretation of a world already familiar to the reader, it gestures beyond
its own circumstantiality towards a more general statement about the
human condition.72 Although the techniques of reportage are often the
techniques of fiction as well, only the former uses facts largely for their
own sake. One reads a newspaper expecting to discover what "actually
happened," and one may be outraged, quite apart from any damage to
reputation that results from inaccurate statements, to learn that the
"truth" of an item that purports to be factual exists only at a synecdochic
or symbolic level.73 Conversely, a work of fiction uses facts also for what
they represent. The work is not so much "real" as "realistic": Its peculiar
value derives from its ability to take the reader beyond both his own
world and the apparently "factual" world of the work, to embody the
general in the particular.
Fiction's use of reportorial technique in the service of synecdochic state-
ment is what the law of libel should strive to protect. However copious
and comprehensive a novelist's imagination, he is invariably bound by his
70. H. SHAW, CONCISE DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS 267 (1972).
71. Another way of expressing this idea is to call the novel a "model":
Whether the governing spirit is satirical or sympathetic, whether the novel's form is docu-
mentary or symbolic, the shaping of experience will move toward what might be called a
model. The value of the model is that it finds a manageable scale or form . . .. [Ilts end is to
study the reality it represents and perhaps to manipulate it experimentally.
Price, The Fictional Contract, in LITERARY THEORY AND STRUCTURE 168 (F. Brady, J. Palmer &
M. Price eds. 1972); see also W. GASS, supra note 69, at 71 (humans are "inveterate model makers,
imposing on the pure data of sense a rigorously abstract system").
72. This is not to suggest that the mimetic qualities of fiction are not pleasurable and valuable in
themselves. The notion that they are is a central tenet of literary criticism from Aristotle, see supra
note 65, to the present day, see supra note 67. It is rather to say that fiction, unlike reportage, engages
in a deliberate and expected shaping of experience, a rounding off of the factually true in the name of
formal and thematic coherence that would be intolerable from something readers expected to tell the
literal truth.
73. Perhaps the best demonstration of this is the controversy over a newspaper article about an
eight-year-old boy addicted to heroin. The author received a Pulitzer Prize for her article but subse-
quently was discovered to have invented the boy: He was a fictional device, a composite assembled
from the reporter's notes to personify her impressions of ghetto drug addiction. The newspaper dis-
missed the author, returned the award, and published a lengthy apology. See Lapham, Gilding the
News, HARPER'S, July 1981, at 31-39. The same article, published or otherwise understood as fiction,
would presumably have been unobjectionable.
Libel and Fiction
own experience in devising his work. Relatively recognizable people from
his own world are likely to populate his fiction."" But because reality does
not reveal its meaning to a novelist any more readily than it does to any-
one else, a writer will select, combine and condense in the service of for-
mal and thematic coherence. An author who believes that unvarnished,
unembellished experience rendered in language has its own synecdochic
significance is entitled to the belief, but ought to be held to its obvious
consequences: If one is merely reporting, one had better tell the literal
truth to the best of one's ability.
Only when the realistic dimension of a work purportedly fictional alto-
gether obscures its synecdochic dimension-when, that is, the work (or a
part of it)7 5 becomes effectively indistinguishable from reportage-should
its author be vulnerable to a charge of libel. When a novel offers to its
readers only what a newspaper account does-a report of particular, iden-
tifiable people taking believable action-it ceases, in effect, to be a novel,
and relinquishes both its claim to tell a sort of truth inaccessible to report-
age and, hence, its claim to any distinct legal protection.7, A statement
that neither embodies a synecdochic truth nor renders a literal truth is
simply a lie. It is, to adopt the Supreme Court's terminology, a "calcu-
lated falsehood," part of whose calculation derives from the disingenuous,
ostensibly fictional context in which it is presented.
74. See H. PILPEL & T. ZAVIN, RIGHTS AND WRITERS: A HANDBOOK OF LITERARY AND EN-
TERTAINMENT LAW 23 (1960) ("[First novels] tend to be autobiographical, and twentieth century
fiction is replete with examples of writers whose first novel, at least, leaned heavily on the author's
(usually unflattering) portrayal of and judgment on his family.").
75. See infra note 86.
76. A rule of absolute privilege seems not only undesirable, but unlikely to receive widespread
support. Such a rule is unlikely to be supported partly because the recent trend of Supreme Court
decisions shows an increasing concern for the individual's reputation. This concern is chiefly embodied
in efforts to limit, and in fact reduce, the scope of the stringent Sullivan actual-malice rule. See Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 418 (1976) (well-publicized divorce case of socialite not a "public contro-
versy" sufficient to activate Sullivan rule); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 417 U.S. 323 (1974) (rejecting
expansive definition of 'public figure' and giving states discretion to establish libel standards with fault
standard as minimum); supra note 2 (citing cases).
A stronger reason for the unlikelihood of an absolute-protection rule for fiction derives from the
form that discussion of the First Amendment has taken. In Sullivan, the "central meaning of the First
Amendment" was said to have been "crystallized" by the "great controversy over the Sedition Act of
1798." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964). Subsequent discussions of the
free speech provisions of the First Amendment have often focused on their "political" dimensions,
with some writers arguing that fiction is or is not entitled to protection depending on the expansive-
ness of their concept of "political." See BeVier, First Amendment Political Speech: An Inquiry into
the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 355-58 (1978) (no First Amendment
protection for fiction as political speech); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 28 (1971) (same); Kalven, supra note 57, at 221 (Sullivan invites "dialecti-
cal progression" leading to Meiklejohn's conclusions); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Abso-
lute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 257 (literature included within politically relevant speech entitled to
absolute protection). One need not exclude fiction altogether from the realm of political speech in
order to acknowledge that it is less political than reportage dealing with the events and figures of
actual politics. As long as the Court denies absolute protection for such reportage, a scheme providing
greater protection for fiction would be anomalous.
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B. "Clear and Convincing" Libel
The crucial "of and concerning" element of a libel case involving fiction
should be a test sufficiently rigorous to preserve a writer's First Amend-
ment freedoms and protect him from liability in all cases but those in
which plaintiff and character are, save for the libelous content, truly indis-
tinguishable. That test should also be sufficiently specific to lead to pre-
dictable results and thus forestall a chilling effect on writers and publish-
ers. A rigorous and specific "of and concerning" standard offers a means
of ascertaining both whether readers might have taken a work of fiction as
reportage and whether they were justified in doing so.
Sullivan and its progeny obliquely and coincidentally provide such a
test. These cases require that proof of actual malice be "clear and convinc-
ing."77 In Sullivan, this requirement relates to the weight of the evidence
presented. This Note proposes that libel cases involving fictional works
demand that the evidence presented to meet the "of and concerning" re-
quirement satisfy a three-part test aimed at establishing the clarity of the
fictional work's reference to the plaintiff and the conviction this reference
prompts in readers.
1. Clarity. The transparency with which a fictional character refers to a
plaintiff should be central to any determination of libel. Only if the refer-
ence is clear does a purportedly fictional work fail to distinguish itself
from reportage.7 But a substantive requirement of clarity, without fur-
ther elaboration, seems vague and not readily distinguishable from the test
of reasonable identification. The criterion can, however, be further partic-
ularized in the first two elements of a proposed three-part "of and con-
cerning" test.
a. Unmistakability. In libel cases involving fiction, evidence of clarity
should first of all be evidence of unmistakability: A character must be
identifiable with the plaintiff and with no one else who does or could
77. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964), requires that evidence
presented to prove the "of and concerning" requirement have "convincing clarity." Subsequent cases
have transmuted the standard to "clear and convincing proof." See Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich,
449 U.S. 966, 970 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342
(1974).
78. It is perhaps worth noting that courts have long considered the clarity of a threat posed by an
exercise of free speech as a predicate to the abridgement of First Amendment rights. Clarity made its
appearance in the Supreme Court's efforts to evolve a test for "clear and present danger," meant to
distinguish protected advocacy of a cause from unprotected incitement to lawlessness. See Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (test is "whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent"). The Court's current test retains a part of the
original standard in requiring that speech not be suppressed or punished unless "likely to incite or
produce" imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). On the develop-
ment of the standard, see Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger". From Schenck to
Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 41.
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exist. When a character is not a composite, and not merely evocative of
but identifiable with a single individual, the novelist has failed to regard
the synecdochic dimension of fiction. Only in such a case should the plain-
tiff be permitted to prevail. 9
A requirement of unmistakability protects authors who attempt to make
their characters more representative by deriving them from multiple
sources. As one court has observed, "suggestion is not identification."80
Readers familiar with a novelist's private circle, or encountering a work
set in the sphere of public affairs, may find that one character "suggests"
to them many people in real life. It seems fair to say that fiction embodies
an economy of suggestion: To the extent one recognizes person A in a
character, one no longer recognizes person B, whose traits may have been
drawn upon for part of the character but are distinguishable from those of
person A. Unless we wish to allow multiple suits for libel over the same
fictional character-which, given the roots of fiction in personal experi-
ence, might amount to a virtual prohibition of realistic fiction-we should
insist that characters prompt no confusion in readers as to their real or
potential sources. Any "of and concerning" standard short of unmis-
takability is, however, likely to encourage witnesses and juries to ignore
such confusion.
b. Individuality. Evidence of clarity should also be evidence of individu-
ality: The allegedly defamatory description must refer personally and spe-
cifically to the plaintiff, and not merely to a class or group of which he is
a member. Because a novelist's medium is particular rather than general,
concrete rather than abstract, he must anchor even observations intended
generally in specific characters and incidents."' When a novelist's targets
are general-when he chooses, for example, to use his art to debunk a
79. Characters in literature can be seen as mixtures, in various proportions, of "representation"
(an effort to reproduce a specific reality) and "illustration" (an effort to present selected aspects of the
actual, which are referable for their meaning not to factual but to ethical or metaphysical truth). R.
SCHOLES & R. KELLOGG, THE NATURE OF NARRATIVE 84-88 (1966). While the novel leans toward
the former pole, it is true that "[miuch of the more interesting literary characterization can be seen as
deriving from the instinct or desire of narrative artists to work on both sides of the gap." Id. at 89. It
has also been argued that the representativeness of characters actually depends on their derivation
from one of several literary "types": "All lifelike characters . . . owe their consistency to the appro-
priateness of the stock type which belongs to their dramatic function." N. FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITI-
CISM 172 (1957).
80. Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1962).
81. See Gugliemi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 869, 603 P.2d 454, 460, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 352, 358 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring). In her concurrence, Chief Justice Bird states that
Contemporary events, symbols and people are regularly used in fictional works. Fiction writers
may be able to more persuasively, or more accurately, express themselves by weaving into the
tale persons or events familiar to their readers. The choice is theirs. No author should be
forced into creating mythological worlds or characters wholly divorced from reality ....
Surely, the range of free expression would be meaningfully reduced if prominent persons in
the present and recent past were forbidden topics for the imaginations of authors of fiction.
Id.
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profession or pursuit-he should be accorded the same privilege as a po-
litical or social commentator inveighing against, say, politicians, lawyers,
or football fans as a group without naming names.82
This second requirement might have forestalled the result in Bindrim v.
Mitchell, in which the witnesses' identification of the plaintiff with the
character appears to have occurred entirely at a general, professional level.
The plaintiff and the character shared no physical characteristics or (to
judge from the opinion) distinguishing personality traits. In fact, it was
Mitchell's "substantially inaccurate description of what actually hap-
pened" at a therapy session and her casting of the plaintiff "in a disparag-
ing light" that led to her liability. 3 Insofar as such inaccuracies and dis-
paragements are due to a work's efforts to discuss and describe (and
82. The individuality requirement must be reconciled with the problem of group libel. In Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction under a state
group-libel criminal statute. The Court accepted the then-prevailing view of libel as being outside the
scope of First Amendment protection, a view since overruled by Sullivan. The potential scope of
criminal libel statutes was restricted in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (extending Sullivan
rule to cases of criminal libel).
Whatever the availability of a criminal libel prosecution, group libel remains a viable civil action. A
plaintiff, who may be any member of the allegedly defamed group, must establish that a libelous
remark was directed at his "small group" and not at some indeterminate class. Church of Scientology
v. Siegelman, 481 F. Supp. 866, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311, 315
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
The proposals of this Note would leave no room for the application of group libel to works of
fiction. This result is due to the peculiar nature of fiction as a concrete medium expressing also a
general truth. In Arcand v. Evening Call Publishing Co., 567 F.2d 1163 (1st Cir. 1977), a defama-
tory charge against one unidentified member of a 21-member police force did not give rise to an action
by all 21. The court suggested that allowing such an action would permit a suit by an entire baseball
team over a report that one member was disciplined for brawling, a result which "would chill com-
munication to the marrow." Id. at 1165.
The argument applies to fiction as well. Because fiction tends to deal in the particular and the
personal, any "charge" it makes will likely be directed at a fictional individual, who under certain
circumstances will be recognizable as a real person. This prototype will then have a valid libel claim.
Allowing the "small group" of which he is a member also to sue for libel on the basis of the same
fictional statement seems unduly harsh, especially when one remembers that the group claim has
validity only after readers make an inductive leap (albeit invited by the synecdochic nature of fiction)
from the particulars of fictional text to a general proposition about a group. The harshness of double
vulnerability to libel, and the distance between a literal fictional statement maligning A and the prop-
osition derived therefrom that A's small group is worthy of scorn, together form a strong argument
against fiction's liability for defamation of a group. An individual defamed by the literal statement of
a fictional text retains his cause of action. Allowing his group a cause of action as well for a statement
that only speculatively refers to it might indeed chill fictional expression to the marrow.
A student Comment appearing shortly before publication of this Note proposes the use of "group
defamation analysis" as a first line of defense for writers of fiction accused of libel. Comment, Defa-
mation by Fiction, 42 MD. L. REV. 387, 411 (1983). The author argues that the use of both "familiar
archetypal characters" (such as "the domineering stage mothers" and "the spy in the trench coat")
and "more mundane stereotypes" (such as "grandmothers" and "stewardesses") is a technique so
common and unavoidable in fiction "that the reasonable reader is reluctant to rely on the use of these
archetypal [characters] to satisfy the 'of and concerning' requirement." Id. at 411-12. The arguments
of the Comment and this Note, though differently expressed, are similar: The attributes of a fictional
character that serve only to identify him with a group or class are not sufficiently "individual" to give
rise to a libel claim.
83. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 77, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
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perhaps attack) a general undertaking, they cannot in themselves be said
to defame an individual. Only when a work of fiction can be found to
refer individually to this nude marathon therapist or this politician should
recovery be permitted.
2. Conviction. Evidence in libel cases dealing with fiction should, addi-
tionally, prove conviction. It is not enough for the plaintiff to be identified
with the character. Only when the immediate context of the allegedly de-
famatory statement convinces the reader of the statement's literal
truth-when, that is, it ceases to be merely imaginable or plausible and
begins to be believed-do damage to reputation, and thus liability, become
possible.
This third requirement solves the problem of how to deal with unques-
tionably real characters used by novelists in hypothetical contexts. 84 Under
the test proposed here, certain actions taken by otherwise identifiable
fictional characters would not be libelous because they are incredible. Isi-
dore Silver discusses Robert Coover's The Public Burning, a novel in
which "Richard Nixon," who is one of the book's two narrators and has
much in common with the political figure of the same name, engages in,
inter alia, "a bungled would-be seduction of the imprisoned Ethel Rosen-
berg."'85 Whatever belief such an incident inspires can be said to be
strictly symbolic; however "true" the statement, the reader presumably
recognizes that its truth is not literal. At the same time, however, the
implausibility of a particular fictional incident, or of a fictional story as a
whole, should not altogether insulate a work from a libel claim. If isolated
incidents, details, or actions in a fictional text are credible and otherwise
satisfy the law of defamation, they can form the basis of a libel suit. 6
84. See Silver, supra note 29, passim; c Comment, supra note 82, at 415-16 (proposing treat-
ment of hypothetical fictional statements about real people as nondefamatory "opinion" or "rhetorical
hyperbole").
85. Id. at 1067-69.
86. The "unit" of a fictional text capable of prompting conviction cannot be identified with any
precision. There is nothing unusual in a critic's praising aspects of a novelist's portrayal as "known
from the inside," F. LEAvIS, THE GREAT TRADITION 61 (1973), while deploring other aspects as not
"real in any sense," id. at 79 (assessing George Eliot's Middlemarch). The law should be capable of a
similar approach. If an unquestionably convincing (and otherwise defamatory) passage is embedded in
a work of the rankest fantasy, the passage should be subject to a libel claim. The brevity of a section
of a work is likely to affect the unmistakability and individuality of the characters it describes, for
these will vary in proportion to the detail the writer provides. But just as criticism can judge brief
sections of a work of fiction more or less plausible, so the law should be able to appraise the allegedly
libelous "units" of a work of fiction as capable or not of convincing readers of their literal truth. The
test should be whether the allegedly libelous section, viewed in but not controlled by its context, is
convincing.
A recent decision of the Tenth Circuit applies a similar test in reversing a jury verdict for an
allegedly defamed plaintiff. In Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3897 (U.S. June 21, 1983) (No. 82-1621), the court held that a magazine
story describing sexual acts performed by an unnamed "Miss Wyoming" during the Miss America
Pageant did not defame the real Miss Wyoming. "The test," said the court, is whether the allegedly
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In closer cases than the "Nixon" would-be seduction, the established
law of libel becomes significant. Even when the "of and concerning" re-
quirement is met, truth would remain a complete defense against a libel
claim: If a "hypothetical" novel happens to have disclosed the truth, the
novelist prevails. Because "public figures," who seem likeliest to be the
subjects of speculative "fictionalizations," must prove that allegedy defam-
atory statements are false,8 1 such plaintiffs cannot recover merely because
they prefer to keep details of their lives out of the public eye. If a plaintiff
does prove that the truth differs from the allegedly libelous statement, a
court can still conclude that the fictional material is "minor in offensive-
ness" 88 when viewed in light of undisputed facts. And if the plaintiff suc-
ceeds in showing that the fictional work varies from the facts in a defama-
tory fashion and consequently does harm to his reputation, then he can
and should prevail. He has been injured by a work that, whatever labels
or disclaimers it offers, presents itself not as fiction but as reportage.
Conclusion
This Note examines the present inconsistencies, irrelevancies, uncer-
tainties, and dangers in the law of defamation when applied to works of
fiction. It accordingly proposes a refinement of the "of and concerning"
element of libel when applied to such works, permitting plaintiffs to re-
cover only upon a showing that fictional characters refer to them unmis-
takably, individually, and convincingly. This proposal has the merit of
stating clear standards that forestall a chilling effect on publishers and
defamatory "portions in context could be reasonably understood as describing actual facts about the
plaintiff or actual events in which she participated." Id. at 442. The court's decision, however, ulti-
mately rested upon its appraisal of these passages in isolation: "it is simply impossible to believe that a
reader would not have understood that the charged portions were pure fantasy and nothing else. It is
impossible to believe that anyone could understand that levitation could be accomplished by oral sex
before a national television audience or anywhere else." Id. at 443.
Because the Pring court also observed that the story "was all fanciful and did not purport to be a
factual account" and that the passages at issue presented "impossibility and fantasy within a fanciful
story," it leaves open the possibility that the same "fanciful" passages might lead to liability in a more
realistic context. The court also explicitly declined to consider the credibility of the acts described as
part of the "of and concerning" requirement, and in fact accepted the jury's special verdict that the
plaintiff and the fictional Miss Wyoming were identical. Id. at 440. In other respects, though, Pring
comports well with the proposals of this Note.
87. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan itself contains no such
specific requirement, but the Supreme Court has interpreted it that way: "We held in New York
Times that a public official might be allowed the civil remedy only if he establishes that the utterance
was false and that it was made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was
false or true." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
88. Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill. 2d 434, 443, 259 N.E.2d 250, 256 (1970) (holding in "false-light"
privacy case that "fictionalized aspects" of book and film are "minor" when compared with known
facts of plaintiff's infamous crime). Although this argument is an ad hoc one, its roots can be found in
Sullivan, which speaks of the fear of self-censorship arising from "the difficulties of adducing legal
proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279. Trivial
falsehoods in a substantially correct account should not give rise to liability.
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writers. It dispenses with the misleading and often devastating Sullivan
standard where it does not apply, while at the same time permitting what
Sullivan intended to allow: a broader protection than the common law
provides for works that fall within the sphere of the First Amendment. It
suggests no radical or improbable changes in the present law, and in fact
complements the requirements of that law. Finally, the standard allows
recovery for deserving plaintiffs when they have actually been libeled by a
work of fiction.
